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Abstract 
This study provides a unified framework to compare three canonical types of contests: winner-
take-all contests won by the best performer, winner-take-all lotteries where probability of 
success is proportional to performance, and proportional-prize contests in which rewards are 
shared in proportion to performance. We derive equilibria and observe outcomes from each 
contest in a laboratory experiment. Equilibrium and observed efforts are highest in winner-take-
all contests. Lotteries and proportional-prize contests have the same Nash equilibrium, but 
empirically, lotteries induce higher efforts and lower, more unequal payoffs. Behavioral 
deviations from theoretical benchmarks in different contests are caused by the same underlying 
attributes, such as risk-aversion and the utility of winning. Finally, we find that subjects exhibit 
consistent behavior across different types of contests, with subjects exerting higher effort in one 
contest also exerting higher effort in another contest. 
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1. Introduction 
A wide variety of competitions arise in economic life, and new ones are regularly 
introduced to attract effort and reward achievement. Such competitions are commonly modeled 
as contests, in which agents compete for prize funds by expending costly resources. There are 
many possible contest designs, but most theoretical models and most competitions created to 
elicit effort use winner-take-all incentives (Konrad, 2009). Despite widespread use of winner-
take-all contests, a growing literature suggests that under some circumstances it is more 
beneficial to use payments proportional to relative performance (Cason et al., 2010; Shupp et al., 
2013; Morgan et al., 2016). The first contribution of this paper is that we provide a unified 
theoretical and experimental framework to compare different contest designs and test how 
contestants respond to winner-take-all as opposed to proportional incentives. 
Given the variety of contests, remarkably little attention has been paid in the 
experimental literature to compare individual behavior across different contest formats, and the 
underlying factors explaining systematic individual differences (Dechenaux et al., 2015). 
Therefore, the second contribution of this paper is that we use a within-subject experimental 
design to study consistency of individual behavior across different contests. 
The unified framework allows us to compare three canonical types of contests: winner-
take-all contests won by the best performer, winner-take-all lotteries where probability of 
success is proportional to performance, and proportional-prize contests in which rewards are 
shared in proportion to performance. For each case we derive the Nash equilibrium for risk-
neutral and self-interested competitors. A novel feature of the model is to examine how random 
noise affects the mapping between a contestant’s effort and their observed performance. This 
exogenous noise represents the effect of imperfect information, for contestants who may not 
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know how well their efforts will produce results, and for employers or contest judges who may 
not be able to observe results directly. The random noise also helps us to obtain a pure strategy 
Nash equilibrium in the deterministic winner-take-all contest, which is not usually the case in 
deterministic contests (Hillman and Riley, 1989; Baye et al., 1996). 
To test the predictions of our model, we conduct a laboratory experiment using a within-
subjects design. Besides eliciting individual effort in various contests, we also collect 
independent measures of subjects’ risk aversion, other-regarding preferences, and utility of 
winning a contest. Our central empirical finding is that the equilibrium and observed efforts are 
consistently highest in the simple deterministic winner-take-all contest. The lottery and the 
proportional-prize contest have the same, lower Nash equilibrium level of effort. Actual 
competitors in both contests typically over-expend effort and hence receive lower payoffs than 
the Nash equilibrium, but sharing the prize induces contestants to choose lower efforts and 
receive higher, more equitable payoffs. Sharing the prize also makes effort levels less sensitive to 
random noise or the subject’s measured risk aversion and utility of winning. This direct 
comparison of the three contest types helps reveal how winner-take-all awards, whether paid 
deterministically or by lottery, can induce excess effort and be preferred by contest designers, 
even though competitors would be better off if prizes were shared proportionally. Contest 
designers are likely to prefer proportional prizes mainly if they wish to make payoffs more 
equitable by rewarding contestants other than just the top performers, to reduce excess effort 
associated with discrete awards, and make efforts more consistent in the face of variation in 
noise and contestants’ individual preferences. 
Additionally, our within-subjects design enables us to answer methodological questions 
pertaining to consistency of behavior across different contests. First, we find evidence that 
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behavioral deviations from theoretical benchmarks in different contests, at least in part, are 
caused by the same underlying preference characteristics. Specifically, we find that risk-aversion 
and the utility of winning, elicited in an incentive compatible way, have similar impact on 
behavior in different contests, with greater risk aversion leading to lower effort and higher utility 
of winning leading to higher effort in all contests. Second, we find that subjects who exert higher 
effort in one contest also exert higher effort in another contest, and this correlation persists even 
after controlling for various factors influencing behavior in both contests. Overall, these results 
suggest that there is a broad behavioral consistency across different types of contests.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a short literature review; 
Section 3 presents the theoretical model; Section 4 describes the experimental design, procedures 
and hypotheses; Section 5 reports the results of the experimental sessions; and Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Perhaps the simplest contest model in the literature is a winner-take-all competition in 
which the highest performing contestant wins the entire prize. In some versions, such as the 
rank-order tournament of Lazear and Rosen (1981), performance is stochastically related to 
effort due to noise in the observation of effort or in the process by which effort is translated into 
performance.1 As the noise variance increases, effort decreases (Bull et al., 1987). However, 
even with noise, incentives in such contests follow a step function, offering much higher 
incentives for top performers and lower incentives for other contestants. As a result, some 
                                                 
1 In other variations, such as all-pay auctions, there is a one-to-one correspondence between performance and effort 
(Hillman and Riley, 1989; Baye et al., 1996). 
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contestants may be discouraged from entering (Cason et al., 2010) or from performing well 
(Brown, 2011) by the presence of a highly skilled competitor.2 
A closely-related form of competition is the winner-take-all lottery contest of Tullock 
(1980), in which the exogenously fixed prize is allocated probabilistically in proportion to 
observable efforts. This contest format has been most widely used to model naturally-occurring 
competitions for a lump-sum reward such as political lobbying (Krueger, 1974; Tullock, 1980; 
Snyder, 1989) or patent races (Fudenberg et al., 1983; Harris and Vickers, 1985, 1987). 
An extensive experimental literature investigates various forms of winner-take-all 
contests (see a review by Dechenaux et al., 2015). Almost without exception, experimental 
studies find puzzling and systematic anomalies – most prominently that contestants incur 
expenditures that exceed Nash equilibrium levels and that expenditures are widely dispersed 
(Sheremeta, 2013, 2015). Although over-expenditure is sometimes desirable (Morgan and 
Sefton, 2000), typically it reduces individual payoffs and decreases economic welfare 
(Sheremeta and Zhang, 2010; Cason et al., 2012, 2017). Moreover, the stark win-or-lose 
structure of payoffs results in a highly inequitable distribution of economic welfare (Frank and 
Cook, 1996). 
An alternative to winner-take-all competition that might generate more efficient and more 
equitable outcomes is a contest that divides the prize in proportion to observable performance 
(Cason et al., 2010). In such a proportional-prize contest, the fixed prize is shared among 
contestants according to their performance. The resulting incentives are similar to a lottery 
contest, but with lower risks and less variance of payoffs across contestants. Proportional prizes 
                                                 
2 This is sometimes referred to as a “discouragement effect,” which describes how a lower ability individual may 
reduce his/her effort when competing against a higher ability individual. The discouragement effect has received 
substantial support from experimental research (Kimbrough et al., 2018) on rank-order tournaments (Weigelt et al., 
1989; Schotter and Weigelt, 1992), all-pay auctions (Davis and Reilly, 1998; Llorente-Saguer et al., 2016; Mago and 
Sheremeta, 2018), and lottery contests (Fonseca, 2009; Mago et al., 2013; Kimbrough et al., 2014). 
 5 
arise naturally in economic situations such as shared rents (Long and Vousden, 1987), profit 
sharing (Weitzman and Kruse, 1990), and labor contracts (Zheng and Vikuna, 2007). Contest 
designers have typically chosen to make fixed prize awards to top performers (McKinsey and 
Company, 2009), but in some situations rewards could be paid out in proportion to achievement 
as in Singh and Masters (2017a, 2017b).  
Some related experimental studies compare behavior in different contests. For example, 
several early studies compare all-pay auctions to lottery contests (Davis and Reilly, 1998; Potters 
et al., 1998). Also, more recent studies compare behavior in lottery contests to proportional-prize 
contests (Fallucchi et al., 2013; Shupp et al., 2013; Chowdhury et al., 2014; Masiliunas et al., 
2014; Morgan et al., 2016). We contribute to this literature by providing a generalized structure 
for comparing different types of contests, including all-pay auctions, rank-order tournaments, 
lottery contests and proportional-prize contests. Also, utilizing a within-subject experimental 
design, we study consistency of individual behavior across different contests. 
 
3. The Theoretical Model 
Our unified model is a contest in which two risk-neutral players 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗 compete for a 
prize 𝑣𝑣. Both players expend individual efforts 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 and 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗. Every player who exerts effort 𝑒𝑒 has to 
bear cost 𝑐𝑐(𝑒𝑒), where 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒,𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 > 0. The performance 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 of player 𝑖𝑖 is determined by a production 
function 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖(𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖|𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖) = 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,         (1) 
where 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 is a random variable which is drawn from the distribution 𝐹𝐹 on the interval [0, +∞). 
This multiplicative production function (1) has been used by O’Keefe et al. (1984), Hirshleifer 
and Riley (1992), and Gerchak and He (2003). The random component 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 can be thought of as 
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random error, imperfect information about performance (Holmström, 1979), or production luck 
(Rubin and Sheremeta, 2015). It can also be interpreted as an unknown ability 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 (Rosen, 1986). 
The share of the prize received by player 𝑖𝑖 depends on the relative individual 
performance and the sensitivity parameter 𝑟𝑟 > 0: 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖, 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗|𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖, 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗) = 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟/(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 + 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑟𝑟).       (2) 
The share of the prize (2) can also be interpreted as the contest success function (CSF), i.e. the 
probability of winning the contest (Skaperdas, 1996).3 Given (1) and (2), the expected payoff for 
player 𝑖𝑖 can be written as: 
𝐸𝐸(𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖) = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣 − 𝑐𝑐(𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖).         (3) 
A deterministic winner-take-all contest similar to the rank-order tournament of Lazear 
and Rosen (1981) is obtained using the restriction 𝑟𝑟 = ∞. A simple all-pay auction of Hillman 
and Riley (1989) can be obtained by further restriction of the random component, i.e. 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 = 1. 
Given the noise distribution 𝐹𝐹 and the restriction 𝑟𝑟 = ∞, the share of the prize (2) for player 𝑖𝑖 
can be written as 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖�𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖, 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗�𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 , 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗� = Pr�𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 > 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗� = Pr�𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗 < 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖/𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗� = ∫𝐹𝐹 �𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗 𝜀𝜀� 𝑓𝑓(𝜀𝜀)𝑑𝑑𝜀𝜀. 
Taking first order conditions and assuming symmetric contestants, the pure strategy equilibrium 
effort in the deterministic winner-take-all contest can be obtained from 
𝑣𝑣 ∫ 𝜀𝜀[𝑓𝑓(𝜀𝜀)]2𝑑𝑑𝜀𝜀 = 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒(𝑒𝑒)𝑒𝑒.        (4) 
Both a probabilistic winner-take-all and a proportional-prize contest arise with the 
alternative restriction 𝑟𝑟 = 1. These contests resemble the rent-seeking contest of Tullock (1980), 
                                                 
3 The production function (1), with multiplicative noise, implies that the CSF (2) satisfies the axioms introduced by 
Skaperdas (1996). In particular, the CSF satisfies the conditions of a probability distribution: ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖�𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 , 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗�𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 , 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗�𝑖𝑖 = 1 
and 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖�𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 , 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗�𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖, 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗� ≥ 0, for all 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 and 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗. Multiplicative noise also guarantees that the contest success function is 
homogeneous, i.e., 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖�𝜆𝜆𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 , 𝜆𝜆𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗�𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖, 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗� = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖�𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 , 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗�𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 , 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗� for all 𝜆𝜆 > 0. 
 7 
with the difference that performance is subject to random noise 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖.4 The difference between the 
probabilistic and proportional-prize contests is in the interpretation of 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖. Specifically, in the 
probabilistic contest, 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 represents the probability of winning the prize, while in the proportional-
prize contest it represents the share of the prize. The pure strategy symmetric equilibrium in 
these contests can be obtained from the first order condition, rearranged as 
𝑣𝑣∬
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗
�𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖+𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗�
2 𝑓𝑓(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖)𝑓𝑓(𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗)𝑑𝑑𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗 = 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒(𝑒𝑒)𝑒𝑒.      (5) 
Closed form solutions for (4) and (5) require assumptions about the distribution of 𝜀𝜀 and 
the cost function 𝑐𝑐. The most commonly used distribution in the experimental contest literature is 
uniform and the most commonly used cost function is quadratic (Bull et al., 1987; Harbring and 
Irlenbusch, 2003; Eriksson et al., 2009; Agranov and Tergiman, 2013). Therefore, we assume 
that 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 and 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗 are i.i.d. and uniformly distributed on the interval [1 − 𝑎𝑎, 1 + 𝑎𝑎], where 𝑎𝑎 ∈ [0,1] 
scales the variance of the distribution.5 Note that the mean of this distribution is 1 as opposed to 
the mean of 0 when the noise is additive (Gerchak and He, 2003). We also assume that 𝑐𝑐(𝑒𝑒) =
𝑒𝑒2/𝑏𝑏. Given these restrictions, the equilibrium effort in the deterministic winner-take-all contest 
(4) for 𝑎𝑎 ∈ [0.5,1] is given by: 
𝑒𝑒∗ = �𝑏𝑏𝑣𝑣 1
4𝑎𝑎
�
1/2
.         (6) 
                                                 
4 One may argue that in a conventional Tullock competition, adding a noise component into a production function is 
redundant since the winner of such a contest is already chosen probabilistically. However, in our model such a noise 
plays a crucial role. First, the random noise is needed to obtain a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the deterministic 
winner-take-all contest. Second, it provides a natural link between the probabilistic winner-take-all contest and the 
proportional-prize contest, since both contests have identical payoff structures. Third, production noise 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 in (1) 
captures different type of uncertainty than the contest success function (2). While the contest success function 
captures uncertainty regarding who is going to be the winner of the contest, production noise captures uncertainty 
regarding individual performance. 
5 The assumption that the error term is uniformly distributed permits a closed form solution for the equilibrium 
effort. The main conclusions of the model are also robust to other noise distributions, such as a (truncated) normal 
distribution, a U-shaped quadratic distribution, and the exponential distribution. The numerical simulations are 
available upon request. 
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Thus, adding sufficient noise in the production function leads to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium 
in the deterministic winner-take-all contest. No pure strategy equilibrium exists in this contest 
with lower levels of noise (Che and Gale, 2000), so one of the purposes of the added noise is to 
ensure that the same type of equilibrium (symmetric pure strategy) exists in all three contests 
formats considered. 
The equilibrium effort in the probabilistic and proportional-prize contest (5) has a more 
complicated expression: 
𝑒𝑒∗ = �𝑏𝑏𝑣𝑣 −2𝑎𝑎2+𝑎𝑎(𝑎𝑎−2) log(1−𝑎𝑎)+𝑎𝑎(𝑎𝑎+2) log(1+𝑎𝑎)+log (1−𝑎𝑎2)
8𝑎𝑎2
�
1/2
.    (7) 
The equilibrium efforts in (6) and (7) depend on the value of the prize 𝑣𝑣, the cost 
parameter 𝑏𝑏, and the variance of the noise 𝑎𝑎. Comparative statics show that an increase in the 
size of the prize increases individual effort.6 It is also straightforward to show that 𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒∗/𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎 < 0 
in both (6) and (7), which means that as the level of noise increases the equilibrium effort 
decreases.7 Finally, equilibrium effort in the deterministic contest (6) is higher than in the 
probabilistic and proportional-prize contest (7) for all values of noise variance 𝑎𝑎. 
The expected payoff at the equilibrium (6) is: 
𝐸𝐸(𝜋𝜋∗) = 𝑣𝑣
2
�1 − 1
2𝑎𝑎
�.         (8) 
The expected payoff at the equilibrium (7) is: 
𝐸𝐸(𝜋𝜋∗) = 𝑣𝑣
2
�1 − −2𝑎𝑎2+𝑎𝑎(𝑎𝑎−2) log(1−𝑎𝑎)+𝑎𝑎(𝑎𝑎+2) log(1+𝑎𝑎)+log (1−𝑎𝑎2)
4𝑎𝑎2
�.   (9) 
                                                 
6 Dasgupta and Nti (1998) and Amegashie (2006) also obtain similar results, but in their models the noise enters the 
contest success function as a constant term instead of a random variable.  
7 One can also evaluate (6) and (7) at the limit as 𝑎𝑎 → 0. In such a case the deterministic contest transforms into an 
all-pay auction (Hirshleifer and Riley, 1992) and the probabilistic and proportional-prize contests transform into a 
rent-seeking contest (Tullock, 1980). We can solve for equilibrium as the variance of noise approaches to zero, by 
evaluating 𝑒𝑒∗ at the limit as 𝑎𝑎 → 0: With L'Hopital’s rule we can show that 𝑥𝑥∗ → 𝑉𝑉/4 as 𝑎𝑎 → 0. Therefore, as the 
variance of noise approaches zero, the equilibrium of this proportional-prize contest approaches the equilibrium of a 
simple Tullock lottery contest without noise (4). A smooth transition exists between this type of contest with a 
random noise and a lottery contest. There is no such transition between a rank-order contest and an all-pay auction 
(Che and Gale, 2000). 
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It is straightforward to show that expected payoff in the probabilistic and proportional-
prize contest (9) is higher than the expected payoff in the deterministic winner-take-all contest 
(8) for all values of noise variance 𝑎𝑎.8  
 
4. Experimental Design, Hypotheses and Procedures  
The experimental design is summarized in Table 1, which shows the parameters faced by 
contestants, equilibrium efforts and expected profits in each of six contests. In all treatments the 
value of the prize is 𝑣𝑣 = 100 experimental francs and the restriction on the cost function is 𝑏𝑏 = 
100. Column headings denote the type of competition. In the first treatment (denoted DET-L), 
subjects participate in the deterministic winner-take-all (DET) contest and face low (L) variance: 
the production noise 𝜀𝜀 has a variance of 𝑎𝑎 = 0.5 that is uniformly distributed on the interval [0.5, 
1.5].9 The only difference in DET-H is that the production noise 𝜀𝜀 has a high variance 𝑎𝑎 = 1 that 
is uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 2]. These two variance levels maximize the difference 
in equilibrium efforts as noise varies, which facilitates identification of treatment effects. 
Identical variances are used in the probabilistic (PROB) lottery-type contest and the 
corresponding proportional-prize (PP) contests, which are designated as PROB-L, PROB-H, PP-
L and PP-H.  
Table 1: Experimental Parameters and Theoretical Predictions 
 
Treatment DET-L DET-H PROB-L PROB-H PP-L PP-H 
Value of the Prize, 𝑣𝑣 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Noise Parameter, 𝑎𝑎 0.5 1 0.5 1 0.5 1 
Equilibrium Effort, 𝑒𝑒∗ 70.7 50.0 34.6 31.1 34.6 31.1 
Expected Payoff, 𝐸𝐸(𝜋𝜋∗) 0.0 25.0 38.0 40.3 38.0 40.3 
 
The theoretical predictions for the six treatments motivate the following hypotheses: 
                                                 
8 The pure strategy Nash equilibrium is defined in all three contests for 𝑎𝑎 ≥ 0.5. 
9 The expected payoff in (8) is non-negative for any 𝑎𝑎 ∈ [0.5,1] and in (9) it is non-negative for 𝑎𝑎 ∈ (0,1]. For that 
reason, in the experiment we set 𝑎𝑎 ≥ 0.5. 
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Hypothesis 1: The effort in all contests decreases in the noise variance (L versus H), 
leading to higher payoffs. 
Hypothesis 2: Deterministic contests (DET) generate higher efforts than probabilistic 
(PROB) and proportional-prize (PP) contests, and hence lower payoffs. 
Hypothesis 3: Probabilistic and proportional-prize contests (PROB and PP) generate the 
same efforts, and hence the same payoffs. 
We conducted twelve sessions to observe actual behavior in contests and to test 
theoretical predictions stated in Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3. The sessions employed a total of 144 
subjects drawn from the population of undergraduate students at Purdue University, and were 
implemented using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Twelve subjects participated in the lab during 
each session. Each session proceeded in six parts. Subjects received printouts of the instructions 
(available in Appendix A) at the beginning of each part and the experimenter read the 
instructions aloud.  
The first three parts of each session corresponded to three of the treatments shown in 
Table 1. The DET-L, PP-L and PROB-L treatments were used in half of the sessions and DET-
H, PP-H and PROB-H treatments were used in the other half of the sessions. The treatments 
were run in different orders in different sessions, with an equal balance of all six possible 
orderings for a randomized complete block design. Each of the three treatments lasted for 20 
periods. In each period subjects were randomly and anonymously paired. The pairing was 
changed randomly every period in order to reduce repeated game incentives, since the 
equilibrium predictions summarized in Table 1 are for static (one-shot) interactions. Each period, 
both contestants were given an initial endowment of 100 francs. They could use their 
endowments to submit an effort between 0 and 100 (including 0.1 decimal points) in order to 
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obtain an additional prize of 100 francs. Subjects were given a cost table which showed the 
quadratic cost associated with each effort. After both contestants chose their efforts, the 
computer multiplied them by a “personal random number” corresponding to the production noise 
to determine their final performance.  
The computer then compared the performances of the two individuals in each group. In 
the DET treatments, the highest performing contestant received the entire prize; in the PROB 
treatments, the computer chose the winner of the entire prize with probabilities that depended on 
the fraction of total effort chosen by each contestant; and in the PP treatments, both contestants 
received a share of 100 francs according to their relative performances. At the end of each 
period, both individuals’ efforts, random numbers, final performances, and individual earnings 
for the period were reported to each subject. 
The final three parts of each session collected additional information about subject 
preferences is some simple and brief tasks. In the fourth part, subjects were given an endowment 
of 100 francs and could expend efforts in a deterministic contest in order to be a winner. The 
procedure followed closely to the DET treatment. The only difference was that the prize value 
was 0 francs. Subjects were told that they would be informed whether they won the contest or 
not. Similar to Sheremeta (2010), we used this procedure to obtain a measure of how important it 
is for subjects to win when winning is costly but provides no monetary reward. Subjects with a 
non-monetary “utility of winning” would value the prize in the main contests more highly, 
potentially raising their optimal effort choice. 
In the fifth part we elicited subjects’ risk preferences using a set of 15 lotteries shown in 
Table 2 to explore how risk tolerance may affect contest effort. Similar to Holt and Laury (2002), 
in each lottery, subjects were asked to state whether they prefer a safe or risky option. Parameters 
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were set in such a way that a subject with risk-neutral preferences would select the first seven 
safe options. 
Table 2: Lottery Choices for Elicitation of Risk Preferences 
 
 Option 1 Option 2 
Choice (Safe Option) (Risky Option) 
# 1 $1 0/20 of $3 20/20 of $0 
# 2 $1 1/20 of $3 19/20 of $0 
# 3 $1 2/20 of $3 18/20 of $0 
# 4 $1 3/20 of $3 17/20 of $0 
# 5 $1 4/20 of $3 16/20 of $0 
# 6 $1 5/20 of $3 15/20 of $0 
# 7 $1 6/20 of $3 14/20 of $0 
# 8 $1 7/20 of $3 13/20 of $0 
# 9 $1 8/20 of $3 12/20 of $0 
# 10 $1 9/20 of $3 11/20 of $0 
# 11 $1 10/20 of $3 10/20 of $0 
# 12 $1 11/20 of $3 9/20 of $0 
# 13 $1 12/20 of $3 8/20 of $0 
# 14 $1 13/20 of $3 7/20 of $0 
# 15 $1 14/20 of $3 6/20 of $0 
* Subjects choose between a safe option 1 ($1 with certainty) 
or a risky option 2 (a chance of receiving either $3 or $0). 
 
Table 3: Dictator Allocations for Elicitation of Other-Regarding Preferences  
 
 Option 1 Option 2 
Choice (Self, Other) (Self, Other) 
#1 $2, $2 $2, $1 
#2 $2, $2 $3, $1 
#3 $2, $2 $2, $4 
#4 $2, $2 $3, $5 
* Subjects choose between option 1 (equal payoffs) or 
option 2 (unequal payoffs). 
 
Finally, in the sixth part we elicited subjects’ preferences towards inequality, using 4 
simple binary choices shown in Table 3. These nonstrategic choices affected the subject’s 
income and the income of another anonymously matched subject. Recent studies have explored 
how various forms of social preferences can affect behavior in contests (see a review by 
Sheremeta, 2016). We employed choices between payoff distributions that are similar to those 
used by Bartling et al. (2009). The first option is always a pair of equal payoffs and the second 
option is always a pair of unequal payoffs. Although option 2 always results in unequal payoffs 
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to the subject and her counterpart, in the first two choices the subject’s payoff is greater, and in 
the last two choices the subject’s payoff is lower than that of another paired subject. 
At the end of each session, 6 out of 60 periods in parts one, two and three were randomly 
selected for payment (2 out of 20 periods for each of the three treatments). The sum of the 
earnings for these 6 periods was exchanged at rate of 40 francs = $1. Subjects were also paid for 
the single decision made in part four, 1 out of 15 decisions made in part five, and 1 out of 4 
decisions made in part six of the experiment. On average, subjects earned $24.50 each, which 
was paid anonymously and in cash. The experimental sessions lasted for about 90 minutes. 
 
5. Results 
5.1. Overview 
Table 4 shows efforts and payoffs in all treatments. First, notice that there is significant 
variation in effort, with standard deviations ranging from 15.6 to 20.9, depending on the 
treatment. Such high variance in individual efforts is also observed in other experimental studies 
(Bull et al., 1987; Davis and Reilly, 1998; Potters et al., 1998; Eriksson et al., 2009; Sheremeta 
2010, 2011; Sheremeta and Zhang, 2010), and it clearly demonstrates that subjects do not 
consistently follow the predictions of the symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium. 
We next examine whether the aggregate behavior conforms to the predictions of the 
theory, beginning with the average effort in each treatment. To compare differences in average 
effort we report conservative, nonparametric Wilcoxon and Mann-Whitney tests that employ 
only statistically independent sessions as the unit of observation. As robustness checks on these 
results we also conducted a series of panel regressions allowing for time period trends and 
treatment ordering effects (which were typically insignificant), using individual subject random 
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effects and standard errors clustered at the session level. These regressions lead to similar 
conclusions as the nonparametric tests.10 
Table 4: Efforts and Payoffs  
 
Treatment DET-L DET-H PROB-L PROB-H PP-L PP-H 
  Effort 
Equilibrium 70.7 50.0 34.6 31.1 34.6 31.1 
Average 62.4 51.2 51.3 46.1 45.2 42.4 
Median  65.0 50.0 51.0 47.0 45.0 41.3 
St. Dev. 20.9 17.4 20.0 17.2 15.6 17.8 
 
Payoff 
Equilibrium 0.0 25.0 38.0 40.3 38.0 40.3 
Average 6.7 20.8 19.7 25.8 27.1 28.9 
Median 0 0 0 0 27.6 28.4 
St. Dev. 47.1 49.0 49.7 49.5 16.5 27.2 
 
In the deterministic contest with high noise variance (DET-H), subjects’ average effort is 
51.2, which is not statistically different from the equilibrium effort of 50.0 (two-tailed Wilcoxon 
test, p-value = 0.46). However, when the noise is low (DET-L), subjects expend average effort of 
62.4, which is lower than the equilibrium effort of 70.7 (two-tailed Wilcoxon test, p-value = 
0.03). This is a surprising result, since previous studies find that efforts in deterministic winner-
take-all contests (rank-order tournaments) are usually either higher or not significantly different 
from theoretical benchmarks (Bull et al., 1987; Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2003; Eriksson et al., 
2009). The major difference of our study is the use of multiplicative noise to adjust individual 
final performance (Gerchak and He, 2003), whereas all other experimental studies employ 
additive noise (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). It is possible that subjects perceive multiplicative noise 
as more risky and thus they restrain their efforts. It is also possible that subjects are biased 
towards choices in the midpoint of the strategy space, in this case an effort of 50.11 
                                                 
10 For brevity we do not report their details but can provide them to interested readers. 
11 To the best of our knowledge, there no other experimental studies on contests utilizing multiplicative noise and no 
studies examining reference points in contests. 
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In probabilistic contests (PROB-L and PROB-H), subjects expend average efforts of 51.3 
and 46.1, which are significantly higher than the equilibrium efforts of 34.6 and 31.1 (two-tailed 
Wilcoxon test, p-values = 0.03 in both cases). This over-expenditure relative to theoretical 
benchmarks is consistent with previous results of Tullock contest experiments (Davis and Reilly, 
1998; Potters et al., 1998; Sheremeta 2010, 2011; Sheremeta and Zhang, 2010). This is a new 
empirical result, however, since our probabilistic contest differs from the standard Tullock 
contest because the noise parameter leads to an imperfect mapping between a contestant’s effort 
and her observed performance. Nevertheless, we still find similar behavioral patterns of over-
expenditure. 
Finally, in proportional-prize contests (PP-L and PP-H), subjects expend efforts of 45.2 
and 42.4, and these effort levels are also significantly higher than the equilibrium efforts of 34.6 
and 31.1 (two-tailed Wilcoxon test, p-values = 0.03 in both cases). These findings are surprising 
given the results from several resent experimental studies, indicating that in proportional-prize 
contests behavior is usually close to Nash equilibrium (Shupp et al., 2013; Chowdhury et al., 
2014; Masiliunas et al., 2014). However, it is important to emphasize that our results are not 
directly comparable because in our proportional-prize contest individual performance is a 
function of both effort and noise, whereas all other proportional-prize contests do not introduce 
noise when mapping effort to performance.  
 
5.2. The Impact of the Noise Variance 
As noted above, a novel feature of this experiment is that noise affecting how effort 
translates into performance is varied systematically in all three contest formats. An increase in 
the noise variance can be considered, for example, as a decrease in a supervisor’s ability to 
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monitor employees in a promotion or bonus tournament. The theoretical model predicts that 
individual efforts decrease in the noise variance (Hypothesis 1). The experiment provides some 
support for this hypothesis. Average efforts decrease significantly from 62.4 to 51.2 in the 
deterministic contest and from 51.3 to 46.1 in the probabilistic contest (one-tailed Mann-Whitney 
test, p-value < 0.01 and p-value = 0.03, respectively). Although average efforts decrease from 
45.2 to 42.4 in the proportional-prize contest with an increase in noise, this difference is only 
marginally statistically significant (one-tailed Mann-Whitney test, p-value = 0.08). 
Result 1. Efforts in contests decrease as the noise variance increases (support for 
Hypothesis 1). 
 
5.3. Comparison of Contest Structures 
Our theoretical model predicts that deterministic contests generate higher efforts than the 
other two contests (Hypothesis 2). This prediction is clearly supported by our data for both high 
and low variance treatments (one-tailed Wilcoxon test, all p-values < 0.03). Moreover, the 
average efforts across all periods shown in Figure 1 demonstrate that the differences in efforts 
between treatments persist across all periods. 
Figure 1: Average Effort over Periods  
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Result 2. Deterministic contests generate higher efforts than proportional-prize and 
probabilistic contests (support for Hypothesis 2). 
Although theory predicts no difference between efforts expended in probabilistic and 
proportional-prize contests, the data indicate that subjects choose higher efforts in the 
probabilistic contest than in the proportional-prize contest. This difference is significant for both 
high and low variance treatments (two-tailed Wilcoxon test, p-values = 0.03 in both cases).  
Result 3. Contrary to theoretical predictions, probabilistic contests generate higher efforts 
than proportional-prize contests (rejection of Hypothesis 3). 
Eisenkopf and Teyssier (2013) observe a similar ranking of efforts in probabilistic and 
proportional-prize contests in a different environment. They attribute this difference to inequity 
aversion because inequity is necessarily greater in the winner-take-all structure of the 
probabilistic contest. We explore the influence of social preferences, as well as non-monetary 
utility of winning and risk preferences, in the next subsection. 
Figure 2: Distribution of Payoffs  
 
 
 
Since effort is costly, greater efforts in pursuit of the given prize reduce the subjects’ net 
payoffs. Table 4 shows that average payoffs are highest in the proportional-prize contest, and 
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these payoffs are significantly greater than in the other two contests (except for PROB-H, where 
the difference is not quite significant; two-tailed Wilcoxon test, p-value = 0.12). Payoffs in the 
proportional-prize contest are also more equitable. Figure 2 displays the distribution of payoffs in 
all treatments. Clearly, inequality in payoffs among contestants is significantly lower in both PP 
treatments than in the DET and PROB treatments. 
Result 4. Proportional-prize contests generate higher and more equitable payoffs than 
deterministic and probabilistic winner-take-all contests. 
In summary, the results of our experiment suggest that deterministic contests generate the 
highest efforts followed by probabilistic and then by proportional-prize contests. As a result, 
subjects receive the highest expected payoff in proportional-prize contests followed by 
probabilistic and then by deterministic contests. Moreover, proportional-prize contests generate 
the most equitable payoffs. 
 
5.4. Effort and Preferences 
Another question that we can answer using our data is whether commonly observed 
behavioral deviations from theoretical benchmarks in different contests are caused by similar 
observable preference characteristics (e.g., risk aversion, other-regarding preferences, and the 
utility of winning). 
The final three tasks at the end of each experimental session elicited information about 
individual preference for winning (Sheremeta, 2010), risk aversion (Holt and Laury, 2002), and 
other-regarding preferences (Bartling et al., 2009). In this section we explore how these factors 
are related to individual behavior in the different contests. 
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Experimental studies provide evidence that in addition to monetary utility, subjects derive 
utility from winning itself (Delgado et al., 2008; Sheremeta, 2010; Price and Sheremeta, 2011, 
2015). We measured subjects’ utility of winning by asking them to submit efforts in a 
deterministic winner-take-all contest where the prize value is 0. Table 5 reports the distribution 
of efforts for the prize of 0 and the corresponding average effort difference from the treatment-
specific mean for the three contests. Almost 60% of subjects submitted positive efforts in this 0-
prize contest, suggesting that the majority of subjects have a non-monetary utility of winning. 
Moreover, Table 5 indicates that subjects who exert a high effort in this contest for a prize of 0 
also tend to exert higher efforts in all three contest formats. The 15 subjects who apparently had 
the greatest utility of winning and expended at least 60 experimental francs ($1.50) to win the 
prize of 0 also exerted considerably greater effort on average in the monetary contests. Their 
efforts were 8.8, 9.4, and 9.1 experimental francs higher on average than the other subjects in the 
deterministic, probabilistic, and proportional-prize contests, respectively. 
Table 5: Elicited Utility of Winning and Efforts  
 
Effort in a 
Tournament with 
the Prize of 0 
Percent of 
Subjects 
Mean Effort 
Deviation in 
DET 
Mean Effort 
Deviation in 
PROB 
Mean Effort 
Deviation in 
PP 
0 42.4% -1.13 -3.70 -0.88 
0.1-10 22.9% 0.59 1.10 -0.71 
10.1-20 2.1% 3.29 10.73 3.43 
20.1-30 4.2% -5.90 0.82 -4.77 
30.1-40 5.6% -5.65 -3.77 -6.50 
40.1-50 8.3% 2.78 1.15 1.83 
50.1-60 4.2% -0.44 8.95 1.03 
60.1-70 6.3% 0.88 6.94 6.30 
70.1-100 4.2% 13.45 9.32 10.10 
* Effort deviations are effort choices minus treatment-specific mean efforts  
 
Experimental research on rent-seeking contests and rank-order tournaments suggests that 
more risk averse subjects exert lower efforts (Millner and Pratt, 1991; Sheremeta, 2011; 
Eisenkopf and Teyssier, 2013; Shupp et al., 2013). To explore the influence of risk aversion 
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among our subjects, we measured their risk preferences using a variant of the multiple price list 
for lotteries (similar to Holt and Laury, 2002), shown in Table 2. The vast majority of subjects 
chose the safe option 1 when the probability of the high payoff in the risky option 2 was small, 
and then crossed over to option 2 at a single point as the high payoff likelihood increased. Table 
6 reports the distribution of the total number of safe options chosen by all subjects in the 
experiment and the corresponding average effort difference from the treatment-specific mean for 
the three contests. More than 60% of subjects choose more than 8 safe options, indicating risk 
averse preferences. Importantly, subjects who have risk averse preferences often choose lower 
efforts on average in the contests, although the pattern seems often mixed, especially for the 
deterministic contest. 
Table 6: Elicited Risk Preferences and Efforts  
 
Total 
Number of 
Safe Choices 
Percent of 
Subjects 
Mean Effort 
Deviation in 
DET 
Mean Effort 
Deviation in 
PROB 
Mean Effort 
Deviation in  
PP 
5-6 11.8% 2.36 2.73 3.81 
7-8 23.6% 3.90 4.27 1.67 
9-10 36.1% -1.43 0.23 -1.08 
11-12 18.8% -4.35 -5.41 -1.40 
13-15 8.3% 2.07 -4.83 -1.49 
* Effort deviations are effort choices minus treatment-specific mean efforts.  
 
A growing body of research has examined how social preferences impact individual 
behavior in contests (Herrmann and Orzen, 2008; Bartling et al., 2009; Gill and Stone, 2010; 
Mago et al., 2016: Sheremeta, 2016). Grund and Sliwka (2005) show theoretically that inequity 
averse agents, who dislike disadvantageous and advantageous inequality of payoffs, exert higher 
efforts than purely self-interested agents. Balafoutas et al. (2012) show experimentally that 
spiteful subjects compete more aggressively than others when in a contest, but are less likely to 
enter contests. Eisenkopf and Teyssier (2013) show theoretically that efforts can be lower in 
proportional-prize contests with inequity averse contestants because payments are more equitable 
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when the prize is split. We measured our subjects’ other-regarding preferences using binary 
choices between equal and unequal payoff distributions (Table 3). The choices are constructed 
such that subjects choosing option 1 for the first two choices, indicate that they are ahead-averse, 
i.e. subjects choose not to be paid more than others, while subjects choosing option 1 for the last 
two choices, indicate that they are behind-averse, i.e. subjects choose not to be paid less than 
others consistently. Table 7 reports the distribution of choices for all subjects and their 
corresponding average effort differences in the three contests. Only a minority of subjects can be 
classified as strongly ahead averse, since only 16 percent of subjects prefer ($2, $2) over ($3, 
$1). Also, only a minority subjects can be classified as strongly behind averse, since only 15.3 
percent of subjects prefer ($2, $2) over ($3, $5). There appears to be little systematic correlation 
between these measures of aheadness aversion and the efforts in the contests, but subjects who 
are behind-averse do tend to choose modestly higher efforts in all three contests. 
Table 7: Elicited Other-Regarding Preferences and Efforts 
 
Choice 
(Self, Other) 
Percent of 
Subjects 
Mean Effort 
Deviation in 
DET 
Mean Effort 
Deviation in 
PROB 
Mean Effort 
Deviation in 
PP 
$2, $2 84.7% -0.03 0.66 0.42 
$2, $1 15.3% 0.13 -3.52 -2.45 
$2, $2 16.0% -3.21 0.29 1.30 
$3, $1 84.0% 0.60 -0.03 -0.26 
$2, $2 41.7% 2.32 3.57 0.42 
$2, $4 58.3% -1.67 -2.51 -0.33 
$2, $2 15.3% 1.83 2.21 0.37 
$3, $5 84.7% -0.34 -0.37 -0.08 
* Effort deviations are effort choices minus treatment-specific mean efforts. 
 
We explore the significance of these independently-measured preferences on contest 
effort choices in a set of multivariate regressions shown in Table 8. To capture heterogeneity 
across individuals, we use a random effect models with individual subject effects. To account for 
learning that is potentially stronger in early periods, we use inverse of the period (invper) as the 
time trend. All regressions in Table 8 also include dummy-variables (not shown) to control for 
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treatment order effects. Since strategic behavior could vary considerably across different 
contests, specification (1) uses only the data from DET treatments, specification (2) uses the data 
from PROB treatments, and specification (3) uses the data from PP treatments. 
Table 8: Random-Effect Regressions of Effort  
 
Treatment DET PROB PP 
Dependent variable, effort (1) (2) (3) 
noise-variance -10.27*** -3.80* -2.00 
  [treatment dummy] (3.24) (2.04) (2.22) 
utility-of-winning 0.07* 0.13*** 0.07* 
  [effort for prize value 0] (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
risk-averse -3.69** -5.67*** -3.24* 
  [1 if number of safe options 1 > 8] (1.61) (1.89) (1.84) 
aheadness-averse -4.08 0.91 1.59 
  [1 if (2,2) is preferred to (2,1) and (3.1)] (3.09) (2.71) (2.97) 
behindness-averse 0.09 -0.93 -1.60 
  [1 if (2,2) is preferred to (2,4) and (3,5)] (3.15) (2.09) (2.16) 
invper -6.57*** 1.26 1.53 
  [inverse of a period trend, 1/t] (2.20) (3.31) (3.15) 
constant 64.65*** 52.92*** 43.60*** 
  (2.52) (2.44) (2.48) 
Observations 2880 2880 2880 
Number of subjects 144 144 144 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
The estimation results indicate that the risk-averse variable, which is a dummy variable 
equal to one if a subject exhibits risk aversion in their lottery choices, is systematically 
associated with lower effort choices in all contests. The utility-of-winning variable is the costly 
effort expended to win the prize that has zero monetary value, and is systematically associated 
with higher effort especially in the probabilistic contest, where over-expenditure relative to the 
theoretical prediction is most pronounced. Finally, no correlation exists between our measures of 
other-regarding preferences (aheadness-averse and behindness-averse) and contest effort 
choices. These conclusions are robust when controlling for all four individual other-regarding 
preference responses (see Table B1 in Appendix B), demographic characteristics (see Table B2 
in Appendix B), and lag variables of past expeience (see Table B3 in Appendix B). 
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Result 5. Risk-aversion and the utility of winning have similar impact on behavior in 
different contests, with higher risk aversion leading to lower effort and higher utility of winning 
leading to higher effort in all contests. 
 
5.5. Correlation of Subjects’ Efforts between Contests  
An important feature of our within-subject experimental design is that it allows us to 
observe individual subject behavior in all three contests. Therefore, we can study whether 
subjects behave consistently across different types of contests. 
Figure 3: Correlation of Subjects’ Efforts between Contests  
 
  
Figure 3 displays pairwise correlations of individual subjects’ efforts between contests. 
The left panel of Figure 3 displays each subject’s average effort in the winner-pay-all 
deterministic (DET-L and DET-H) and probabilistic (PROB-L and PROB-H) contests. A data 
point represents an individual subject’s average effort in the deterministic contest (y-axis) and 
the probabilistic contest (x-axis). Consistent with the apparent correlation, the Spearman 
correlation coefficient between the deterministic and probabilistic efforts is ρ = 0.50. 
Interestingly, the correlation is higher between the high noise variance treatments (ρ = 0.59) than 
between the low noise variance treatments (ρ = 0.34). This suggests that at least part of the 
observed correlation of individual subjects’ efforts between the two contests can be driven by 
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factors that influence behavior in both contests. To check this, we have estimated several 
seemingly unrelated regressions (see Table B4 in Appendix B) to account for correlation of error 
terms between contests and factors influencing behavior in both contests, such as the noise 
variance and preference characteristics (e.g., risk aversion, other-regarding preferences, and the 
utility of winning). Accounting for all these factors reduces correlation by only 0.05, suggesting 
that subjects exhibit consistent behavior across different types of contests. 
The middle panel of Figure 3 displays the correlation of effort between the deterministic 
(DET-L and DET-H) and proportional-prize (PP-L and PP-H) contests. The Spearman 
correlation coefficient is ρ = 0.45 using all data, ρ = 0.56 using data from the high noise variance 
treatments, and ρ = 0.28 using data from the low noise variance treatments. Accounting for the 
factors influencing behavior in both contests, the correlation is reduced by 0.04 (see Table B5 in 
Appendix B). 
Finally, the right panels of Figure 3 displays the correlation of effort between the 
proportional-prize (PP-L and PP-H) and probabilistic (PROB-L and PROB-H) contests. The 
Spearman correlation coefficient is ρ = 0.45 using all data, ρ = 0.64 using data from high noise 
variance treatments, and ρ = 0.21 using data from low noise variance treatments. Accounting for 
the factors influencing behavior in both contests, the correlation is reduced by 0.06 (see Table B6 
in Appendix B). 
Result 6. A significant correlation of subjects’ efforts exists between contests, as subjects 
who exert higher effort in one contest also typically exert higher effort in another contest. This 
correlation is stronger between high noise variance treatments than between low noise variance 
treatments. However, this correlation persists even after controlling for various factors 
influencing behavior across contests. 
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6. Conclusion 
This study makes two main contributions. First, we provide a unified theoretical and 
experimental framework to compare different contest designs and test how contestants respond 
to winner-take-all as opposed to proportional incentives. Second, we examine consistency of 
individual behavior across different contests. 
Our model compares three contest designs: In deterministic winner-take-all contests, a 
single prize is allocated to the highest performing contestant. Probabilistic winner-take-all 
contests allocate that prize by lottery with probabilities weighted by the contestants’ share of 
total performance. A proportional-prize contest divides that same prize among the contestants 
according to their share of total performance. For each case we derive the Nash equilibrium for 
risk-neutral and self-interested competitors. To test the predictions of our model, we conduct a 
laboratory experiment using a within-subjects design. We also elicit contestants’ levels of risk 
aversion, other-regarding preferences, and utility of winning a contest without monetary value, 
and then test the degree to which these preferences help explain subjects’ choices. 
Equilibrium and observed efforts are consistently highest in the deterministic winner-
take-all contest. The equilibrium level of effort is lower and identical for the probabilistic and 
proportional contests. Relative to the Nash equilibrium, subjects incur excess effort in both of 
these contest types, but this over-expenditure is larger in the winner-take-all lottery than when 
the prize is shared proportionally to performance. Behavioral deviations from theoretical 
benchmarks in different contests are caused by the same underlying attributes, such as risk-
aversion and the utility of winning. Finally, we find that subjects exhibit consistent behavior 
across different types of contests, with subjects exerting higher effort in one contest also exerting 
higher effort in another contest. 
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Our study contributes to several areas of research. First, we provide a unified theoretical 
model of different contests and show that deterministic and probabilistic winner-take-all and 
proportional-prize contests can be derived from the same underling theoretical structure. There 
has been some effort to identify theoretically common links between different contests in the 
literature (Fang, 2002; Jia, 2007; Fu and Lu, 2012; Chowdhury and Sheremeta, 2015). 
Hirshleifer and Riley (1992), for example, show how an R&D race between two players that is 
modeled as a rank-order tournament of Lazear and Rosen (1981) is equivalent to a lottery contest 
of Tullock (1980). Similarly, Baye and Hoppe (2003) identify conditions under which innovation 
tournaments and patent-race models are strategically equivalent to the lottery contest. Our 
contribution to this literature is to show that the three canonical models of Tullock (1980), 
Lazear and Rosen (1981), and Hillman and Riley (1989) can be obtained from the same 
generalized theoretical structure. 
Our study also makes a novel contribution to the experimental literature on contests, 
reviewed recently in Dechenaux et al. (2015). Since the early attempts of Bull et al. (1987) and 
Millner and Pratt (1989), a growing number of studies have examined behavior in different types 
of contests. Almost without exception, existing experimental studies find systematic deviation of 
behavior from theoretical predictions, such as expenditures that exceed Nash equilibrium levels 
and are widely dispersed, but confirm the various models’ comparative statics predictions. Our 
results are similarly consistent. We find support for our comparative statics predictions, but we 
also find systematic deviation of behavior from theoretical predictions. Importantly, we find that 
behavioral deviations from theoretical benchmarks in different contests, at least in part, are 
caused by similar preference heterogeneity, such as risk-aversion and the utility of winning.  
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 Our research also complements recent experimental studies comparing behavior in 
proportional-prize contests to lottery contests (Cason et al., 2010; Chowdhury et al., 2014; 
Masiliunas et al., 2012; Fallucchi et al., 2013). Most of these studies find that lottery contests 
generate higher efforts than proportional-prize contests. Our experiment shows that this same 
ranking between the proportional-prize and lottery contests is robust to a setting where there is a 
noisy mapping between a contestant’s effort and their observed performance. This is a more 
realistic assumption for many real world contestants who may not know how well their efforts 
produce results and employers may not be able to observe effort or performance directly. 
Finally, our study contributes to the discussion on the optimal design of contests 
(Gradstein, 1998; Moldovanu and Sela, 2001; Sheremeta, 2011). One principal motivation here 
is to help understand the behavior of both contestants and contest designers, in particular to 
explain why artificial contests almost always offer winner-take-all prizes instead of shared 
rewards (McKinsey and Company, 2009). In our setting, winner-take-all prizes elicit higher 
efforts, leaving contestants with lower average and more unequal payoffs. This robust difference 
in behavior is consistent with Nash equilibrium when the prize is paid deterministically, and 
arises despite an identical Nash equilibrium prediction when the prize is awarded 
probabilistically. The implication is that contest sponsors who choose winner-take-all incentives 
in this setting elicit greater effort at the expense of contestants’ welfare. A contest designer 
concerned with social efficiency or inequality should offer proportional incentives instead.12 
Exploring the generalizability of this conclusion will require further work in other settings, 
                                                 
12 Proportional incentives would also be helpful in situations where contestants are not symmetrical, to overcome the 
discouragement effect of rank order contests and elicit more entry and effort from contestants who are likely to be 
lower-ranked (Cason et al. 2010, Singh and Masters 2017a). Even with symmetric contestants, however, maximizing 
total effort and/or individual payoffs are not the only objectives that the contest designer may pursue. Often, the 
objective of a contest designer is to maximize the highest individual effort (as in R&D races) or to minimize the 
total equilibrium effort (as in electoral races). These and other objectives would require different types of contest 
structures that are beyond the scope of the current study. 
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including laboratory and field experiments with varying costs and payoff structures. We 
anticipate that such work could further advance understanding of why designers choose 
particular contest rules, and the resulting welfare implications. 
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Appendix A (For Online Publication) - Experimental Instructions 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in the economics of strategic decision making. Various research agencies have 
provided funds for this research. The instructions are simple.  If you follow them closely and make appropriate 
decisions, you can earn an appreciable amount of money. 
The experiment will proceed in six parts. Each part contains decision problems that require you to make a 
series of economic choices which determine your total earnings. The currency used in Parts 1 through 4 of the 
experiment is francs. Francs will be converted to U.S. dollars at a rate of _60_ francs to _1_ dollar. The currency 
used in Parts 5 and 6 of the experiment is U.S. dollars. At the end of today’s experiment, you will be paid in private 
and in cash. There are 12 participants in today’s experiment. 
It is very important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have any 
questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk, 
laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your 
cooperation.  
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 1 
YOUR DECISION 
This part of the experiment consists of 20 decision-making periods. At the beginning of each period, you 
will be randomly and anonymously paired with someone else in a group of two participants. The composition of 
your group will be changed randomly every period. Each period, both participants will be given an initial 
endowment of 100 francs. You will use this endowment to bid for a share of an additional 100 francs reward 
available in each period. You may bid any number between 0 and 100 (including 0.1 decimal points). An example of 
your decision screen is shown below. 
 
For each bid there is an associated cost. Table is attached to these instructions: each possible bid is given in 
column A, and its cost is given in column B. Note that as bids rise from 0 to 100, costs rise exponentially. The cost 
of bid can be also calculated using the following formula: 
2(Your bid)Cost of bid =
100
 
After you make your bid, the computer will multiply it by a “personal random number” to determine your 
final bid. This number can take any value between 0.5 and 1.5. Each number between 0.5 and 1.5 is equally likely 
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to be drawn and there is one separate and independent random draw between 0.5 and 1.5 for each decision period 
and each person in the lab.  
Your final bid = your bid × your personal random number 
 
YOUR EARNINGS 
After you and the other participant in your group have chosen your bids, the computer will draw the 
random numbers and compare your final bid to the other participant’s final bid, and allocate to you a share of the 
100 franc reward according to your share of the sum of the two final bids. In other words, your share is: 
Share = 100 × 
Your final bid  
Your final bid + The other participant’s final bid 
You also retain any endowment not spent on the bid, so your total earnings for the period are equal to your 
endowment plus the share minus the cost of your bid. In other words, your earnings are: 
Earnings = Endowment + Share – Cost of your bid = 100 + Share – Cost of your bid 
Note that the cost of your bid is determined by the bid you chose. The random number influences only your 
share of the final bids for that period.  
 
An Example 
Let’s say you make a bid of 36 francs, while the other participant in your group makes a bid of 40 francs, 
and then your personal random number turns out to be 1.25 while the other participant in your group has a personal 
random number of 0.8. Therefore, your final bid is 45 = 36 × 1.25 and the other participant’s final bid is 32 = 40 × 
0.8. Your share of the reward is 4558.44 = 100
45 + 32
× . Finally, your earnings for the period are 145.48 = 100 + 58.44 
– 12.96, because the cost of your bid of 36 is 12.96 as shown on your Cost of Bid table. 
At the end of each period, your bid, your random number, your final bid, the other participant’s bid, the 
other participant’s random number, the other participant’s final bid, your share, and your earnings for the period are 
reported on the outcome screen as shown below. Once the outcome screen is displayed you should record your 
results for the period on your Personal Record Sheet under the appropriate heading. 
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IMPORTANT NOTES 
 You will not be told which of the participants in this room are assigned to which group. At the beginning of 
each period you will be randomly re-grouped with one of the other participants to from a two-person group. 
At the end of the experiment we will randomly choose 2 of the 20 periods for actual payment for this part 
of experiment using a bingo cage. You will sum the total earnings for these 2 periods and convert them to a U.S. 
dollar payment. 
 
Table – Cost of Bid  
 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 2 
YOUR DECISION 
This part of the experiment consists of 20 decision-making periods. At the beginning of each period, you 
will be randomly and anonymously paired with someone else in a group of two participants. The composition of 
your group will be changed randomly every period. Each period, both participants will be given an initial 
endowment of 100 francs. You will use this endowment to bid for an additional 100 francs reward available in 
each period. You may bid any number between 0 and 100 (including 0.1 decimal points). An example of your 
decision screen is shown below. 
Column A Column B Column A Column B Column A Column B
Bid Cost of Bid Bid Cost of Bid Bid Cost of Bid
0 0.00 34 11.56 68 46.24
1 0.01 35 12.25 69 47.61
2 0.04 36 12.96 70 49.00
3 0.09 37 13.69 71 50.41
4 0.16 38 14.44 72 51.84
5 0.25 39 15.21 73 53.29
6 0.36 40 16.00 74 54.76
7 0.49 41 16.81 75 56.25
8 0.64 42 17.64 76 57.76
9 0.81 43 18.49 77 59.29
10 1.00 44 19.36 78 60.84
11 1.21 45 20.25 79 62.41
12 1.44 46 21.16 80 64.00
13 1.69 47 22.09 81 65.61
14 1.96 48 23.04 82 67.24
15 2.25 49 24.01 83 68.89
16 2.56 50 25.00 84 70.56
17 2.89 51 26.01 85 72.25
18 3.24 52 27.04 86 73.96
19 3.61 53 28.09 87 75.69
20 4.00 54 29.16 88 77.44
21 4.41 55 30.25 89 79.21
22 4.84 56 31.36 90 81.00
23 5.29 57 32.49 91 82.81
24 5.76 58 33.64 92 84.64
25 6.25 59 34.81 93 86.49
26 6.76 60 36.00 94 88.36
27 7.29 61 37.21 95 90.25
28 7.84 62 38.44 96 92.16
29 8.41 63 39.69 97 94.09
30 9.00 64 40.96 98 96.04
31 9.61 65 42.25 99 98.01
32 10.24 66 43.56 100 100.00
33 10.89 67 44.89
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For each bid there is an associated cost. Table is attached to these instructions: each possible bid is given in 
column A, and its cost is given in column B. Note that as bids rise from 0 to 100, costs rise exponentially. The cost 
of bid can be also calculated using the following formula: 
2(Your bid)Cost of bid =
100
 
After you make your bid, the computer will multiply it by a “personal random number” to determine your 
final bid. This number can take any value between 0.5 and 1.5. Each number between 0.5 and 1.5 is equally likely 
to be drawn and there is one separate and independent random draw between 0.5 and 1.5 for each decision period 
and each person in the lab.  
Your final bid = your bid × your personal random number 
 
YOUR EARNINGS 
After you and the other participant in your group have chosen your bids, the computer will draw the 
random numbers and compare your final bid to the other participant’s final bid. If your final bid is higher than the 
other participant’s final bid, you will receive a reward of 100 francs. Otherwise you will receive 0 francs. 
If you receive the reward, your earnings for the period are equal to your endowment plus the reward minus 
the cost of your bid. If you do not receive the reward, your earnings for the period are equal to your endowment 
minus the cost of your bid. In other words, your earnings are: 
If you receive the reward: 
Earnings = Endowment + Reward – Cost of your bid = 100 + 100 – Cost of your bid 
If you do not receive the reward: 
Earnings = Endowment – Cost of your bid = 100 – Cost of your bid 
Note that the cost of your bid is determined by the bid you chose, rather than the final bid influenced by the 
random number. 
 
An Example 
Let’s say you make a bid of 36 francs while the other participant in your group makes a bid of 40 francs, 
and then your personal random number turns out to be 1.25 while his personal random number is 0.8. Therefore, 
your final bid is 45 = 36 × 1.25 and the other participant’s final bid is 32 = 40 × 0.8. Since your final bid of 45 is 
higher than the other participant’s final bid of 32, you receive the reward. Your earnings for the period are 187.04 = 
100 + 100 – 12.96, because the cost of  your bid of 36 is 12.96 as shown on your Cost of Bid table. 
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At the end of each period, your bid, your random number, your final bid, the other participant’s bid, the 
other participant’s random number, the other participant’s final bid, your reward, and your earnings for the period 
are reported on the outcome screen as shown below. Once the outcome screen is displayed you should record your 
results for the period on your Personal Record Sheet under the appropriate heading. 
 
 
IMPORTANT NOTES 
 You will not be told which of the participants in this room are assigned to which group. At the beginning of 
each period you will be randomly re-grouped with one of the other participants to from a two-person group. 
At the end of the experiment we will randomly choose 2 of the 20 periods for actual payment for this part 
of experiment using a bingo cage. You will sum the total earnings for these 2 periods and convert them to a U.S. 
dollar payment. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 3 
YOUR DECISION 
This part of the experiment consists of 20 decision-making periods. At the beginning of each period, you 
will be randomly and anonymously paired with someone else in a group of two participants. The composition of 
your group will be changed randomly every period. Each period, both participants will be given an initial 
endowment of 100 francs. You will use this endowment to bid for an additional 100 francs reward available in 
each period. You may bid any number between 0 and 100 (including 0.1 decimal points). An example of your 
decision screen is shown below. 
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For each bid there is an associated cost. Table is attached to these instructions: each possible bid is given in 
column A, and its cost is given in column B. Note that as bids rise from 0 to 100, costs rise exponentially. The cost 
of bid can be also calculated using the following formula: 
2(Your bid)Cost of bid =
100
 
After you make your bid, the computer will multiply it by a “personal random number” to determine your 
final bid. This number can take any value between 0.5 and 1.5. Each number between 0.5 and 1.5 is equally likely 
to be drawn and there is one separate and independent random draw between 0.5 and 1.5 for each decision period 
and each person in the lab.  
Your final bid = your bid × your personal random number 
 
YOUR EARNINGS 
The computer will draw the random numbers to determine your final bid to the other participant’s final bid. 
The chance that you receive the reward is higher when you bid higher, and is lower when the other participant bids 
higher: 
Chance of Receiving the Reward =  
Your final bid  
Your final bid + The other participant’s final bid 
You can consider the amounts of the final bids to be equivalent to numbers of lottery tickets. The computer 
will draw one ticket from those entered by you and the other participant through your final bids, and assign the 
reward to one of you through this random draw. If you receive the reward, your earnings for the period are equal to 
your endowment plus the reward minus the cost of your bid. If you do not receive the reward, your earnings for the 
period are equal to your endowment minus the cost of your bid. In other words, your earnings are: 
If you receive the reward: 
Earnings = Endowment + Reward – Cost of your bid = 100 + 100 – Cost of your bid 
If you do not receive the reward: 
Earnings = Endowment – Cost of your bid = 100 – Cost of your bid 
Note that the cost of your bid is determined by the bid you chose, rather than the final bid influenced by the 
random number. 
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An Example 
Let’s say you make a bid of 36 francs, while the other participant in your group makes a bid of 40 francs, 
and then your personal random number turns out to be 1.25 while the other participant in your group has a personal 
random number of 0.8. Therefore, your final bid is 45 = 36 × 1.25 and the other participant’s final bid is 32 = 40 × 
0.8. Your chance of receiving the reward is 0.58 = 45/(45+32). Assume that the computer assigns the reward to you, 
then your earnings for the period are 187.04 = 100 + 100 – 12.96, because the cost of your bid of 36 is 12.96 as 
shown on your Cost of Bid table. 
At the end of each period, your bid, your random number, your final bid, the other participant’s bid, the 
other participant’s random number, the other participant’s final bid, your reward, and your earnings for the period 
are reported on the outcome screen as shown below. Once the outcome screen is displayed you should record your 
results for the period on your Personal Record Sheet under the appropriate heading. 
 
 
IMPORTANT NOTES 
 You will not be told which of the participants in this room are assigned to which group. At the beginning of 
each period you will be randomly re-grouped with one of the other participants to from a two-person group. 
At the end of the experiment we will randomly choose 2 of the 20 periods for actual payment for this part 
of experiment using a bingo cage. You will sum the total earnings for these 2 periods and convert them to a U.S. 
dollar payment. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 4 
This part of the experiment consists of only 1 decision-making period. The rules for this part are the same 
as the rules for Part 2. At the beginning of the period, you will be you randomly and anonymously paired with 
someone else in a group of two participants. You will be given an initial endowment of 100 francs. You will use 
this endowment to bid in order to be a winner. You may bid any number between 0 and 100 (including 0.1 decimal 
points). The only difference from Part 2 is that the winner does not receive the reward. Therefore, the reward is 
worth 0 francs to you and the other participant in your group.  
After you make your bid, the computer will multiply it by a “personal random number” to determine your 
final bid. This number can take any value between 0.5 and 1.5. Each number between 0.5 and 1.5 is equally likely 
to be drawn and there is one separate and independent random draw between 0.5 and 1.5 for each decision period 
and each person in the lab. After you and the other participant in your group have chosen your bids, the computer 
will draw the random numbers and compare your final bid to the other participant’s final bid. If your final bid is 
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higher than the other participant’s final bid, you will be declared the winner. After all participants have made their 
decisions, your earnings for the period are calculated: 
If you win: 
Earnings = Endowment – Cost of your bid = 100 – Cost of your bid 
If you do not win: 
Earnings = Endowment – Cost of your bid = 100 – Cost of your bid 
Note that the cost of your bid is determined by the bid you chose, rather than the final bid influenced by the 
random number. 
After all participants have made their decisions, you will learn whether you win or not. The computer then 
will display your earnings for the period on the outcome screen. Your earnings will be converted to cash and paid at 
the end of the experiment. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 5 
YOUR DECISION 
In this part of the experiment you will be asked to make a series of choices in decision problems. How 
much you receive will depend partly on chance and partly on the choices you make. The decision problems are not 
designed to test you. What we want to know is what choices you would make in them. The only right answer is what 
you really would choose. 
For each line in the table in the next page, please state whether you prefer option A or option B. Notice that 
there are a total of 15 lines in the table but just one line will be randomly selected for payment. You do not know 
which line will be paid when you make your choices. Hence you should pay attention to the choice you make in 
every line. After you have completed all your choices a token will be randomly drawn out of a bingo cage 
containing tokens numbered from 1 to 15. The token number determines which line is going to be paid. 
Your earnings for the selected line depend on which option you chose: If you chose option A in that line, 
you will receive $1. If you chose option B in that line, you will receive either $3 or $0. To determine your earnings 
in the case you chose option B there will be second random draw. A token will be randomly drawn out of the bingo 
cage now containing twenty tokens numbered from 1 to 20. The token number is then compared with the numbers in 
the line selected (see the table). If the token number shows up in the left column you earn $3. If the token number 
shows up in the right column you earn $0. 
Deci
sion 
no. 
Opti
on A 
Option 
B 
Please  
choose  
A or B 
1 $1 $3 never $0 if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
2 $1 $3 if 1 comes out of the bingo cage $0 if 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
3 $1 $3 if 1 or 2 $0 if 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
4 $1 $3 if 1,2,3 $0 if 4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
5 $1 $3 if 1,2,3,4, $0 if 5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20 
 6 $1 $3 if 1,2,3,4,5 $0 if 6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
7 $1 $3 if 1,2,3,4,5,6 $0 if 7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
8 $1 $3 if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 $0 if 8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
9 $1 $3 if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 $0 if 9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
10 $1 $3 if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 $0 if 10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20 
 11 $1 $3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 $0 if 11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
12 $1 $3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11 $0 if 12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
13 $1 $3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12 $0 if 13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
14 $1 $3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13 $0 if 14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
15 $1 $3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14 $0 if 15,16,17,18,19,20  
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 6 
YOUR DECISION 
In this part of the experiment you will be asked to make a series of choices in decision problems. For each 
line in the table in the next page, please state whether you prefer option A or option B. Notice that there are a total of 
4 lines in the table but just one line will be randomly selected for payment. Each line is equally likely to be chosen, 
so you should pay equal attention to the choice you make in every line. After you have completed all your choices a 
token will be randomly drawn out of a bingo cage containing tokens numbered from 1 to 4. The token number 
determines which line is going to be paid. 
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Your earnings for the selected line depend on which option you chose: if you chose option A in that line, 
you will receive $2 and the other participant who will be matched with you will also receive $2. If you chose option 
B in that line, you and the other participant will receive earnings as indicated in the table for that specific line. For 
example, if you chose B in line 2 and this line is selected for payment, you will receive $3 and the other participant 
will receive $1. Similarly, if you chose B in line 3 and this line is selected for payment, you will receive $2 and the 
other participant will receive $4. 
After you have completed all your choices we will use a bingo cage to determine which line is going to be 
paid. Then the computer will randomly and anonymously match you with another participant in the experiment. 
While matching you with another participant, the computer will also randomly determine whose decision to 
implement. If the computer chooses your decision to implement, then the earnings to you and the other participant 
will be determined according to your choice of A or B. If the computer chooses the other participant decision to 
implement, then the earnings will determined according to the other participant choice of A or B. 
Decis
ion 
no. 
Distribution A 
(you, the other participant) 
Distribution B 
(you, the other participant) 
Please  
choose  
A or B 
1 $2 to you, $2 to other participant $2 to you, $1 to other participant  
2 $2 to you, $2 to other participant $3 to you, $1 to other participant  
3 $2 to you, $2 to other participant $2 to you, $4 to other participant  
4 $2 to you, $2 to other participant $3 to you, $5 to other participant  
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Appendix B (For Online Publication) – Additional Analysis 
 
Table B1: Random-Effect Regressions of Effort (Controlling for All Four Individual 
Other-Regarding Preference Responses) 
 
Treatment DET PROB PP 
Dependent variable, effort (1) (2) (3) 
noise-variance -10.06*** -1.89 -3.15 
  [treatment dummy] -3.39 -2.22 -2.13 
utility-of-winning 0.06 0.07* 0.10*** 
  [effort for prize value 0] -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
risk-averse -3.59** -3.17* -5.22*** 
  [1 if number of safe options 1 > 8] -1.75 -1.88 -1.97 
aheadness-averse-1 -0.28 1.61 3.53* 
  [1 if (2,2) is preferred to (2,1)] -2.47 -1.43 -1.82 
aheadness-averse-2 -3.68 1.31 0.86 
  [1 if (2,2) is preferred to (3.1)] -3.28 -3.03 -2.83 
behindness-averse-1 2.93 -0.05 5.52 
  [1 if (2,2) is preferred to (2,4)] -3.47 -2.19 -3.88 
behindness-averse-2 -1.93 -1.04 -3.36 
  [1 if (2,2) is preferred to (3,5)] -3.58 -2.29 -2.81 
Invper -6.57*** 1.53 1.26 
  [inverse of a period trend, 1/t] -2.20 -3.15 -3.31 
constant 63.88*** 42.12*** 47.78*** 
  -3.08 -2.98 -3.33 
Observations 2736 2736 2736 
Number of subjects 144 144 144 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in parenthesis. 
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Table B2: Random-Effect Regressions of Effort (Controlling for Gender and Age) 
 
Treatment DET PROB PP 
Dependent variable, effort (1) (2) (3) 
noise-variance -10.36*** -3.83* -2.11 
  [treatment dummy] -3.33 -2.04 -2.24 
utility-of-winning 0.07* 0.13*** 0.08** 
  [effort for prize value 0] -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
risk-averse -3.51** -5.69*** -3.11 
  [1 if number of safe options 1 > 8] -1.57 -1.93 -1.92 
aheadness-averse -3.82 0.64 1.72 
  [1 if (2,2) is preferred to (2,1) and (3.1)] -3.08 -2.84 -3.02 
behindness-averse -0.41 -1.19 -2.07 
  [1 if (2,2) is preferred to (2,4) and (3,5)] -3.61 -2.18 -2.44 
invper -6.69*** 1.00 1.75 
  [inverse of a period trend, 1/t] -2.17 -3.28 -3.15 
male -1.82 1.46 -0.63 
  [1 if male and 0 otherwise] -2.53 -2.46 -1.98 
age -0.10 0.34 0.04 
  [age of subject] -0.46 -0.48 -0.35 
constant 68.16*** 44.88*** 42.78*** 
  -8.87 -9.79 -8.06 
Observations 2840 2840 2840 
Number of subjects 144 144 144 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in parenthesis. 
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Table B3: Random-Effect Regressions of Effort (Controlling for Lag Variables) 
 
Treatment DET PROB PP 
Dependent variable, effort (1) (2) (3) 
noise-variance -2.74*** -1.29* -0.31 
  [treatment dummy] -0.93 -0.71 -0.99 
utility-of-winning 0.03** 0.06*** 0.04** 
  [effort for prize value 0] -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
risk-averse -1.58*** -2.47*** -1.63* 
  [1 if number of safe options 1 > 8] -0.54 -0.80 -0.90 
aheadness-averse -1.55 0.64 0.98 
  [1 if (2,2) is preferred to (2,1) and (3.1)] -1.17 -1.17 -1.56 
behindness-averse 0.15 -0.78 -0.65 
  [1 if (2,2) is preferred to (2,4) and (3,5)] -1.16 -0.84 -1.03 
invper 4.99*** 4.24* 4.02* 
  [inverse of a period trend, 1/t] -1.69 -2.31 -2.31 
effort-lag 0.66*** 0.60*** 0.53*** 
  [own effort in period t-1] -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 
number-lag 0.24 0.23 -0.42 
  [own random number in period t-1] -0.73 -0.65 -0.58 
othereffort-lag 0.10*** 0.07*** 0.11*** 
  [other effort in period t-1] -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 
othernumber-lag 0.40 1.40*** 2.58*** 
  [other random number in period t-1] -0.45 -0.43 -0.74 
constant 14.24*** 15.82*** 12.97*** 
  -1.78 -1.69 -2.23 
Observations 2736 2736 2736 
Number of subjects 144 144 144 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in parenthesis. 
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Table B4: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (DET and PROB) 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable, effort in DET    
noise-variance 
 
-11.18*** -10.17*** 
  [treatment dummy] 
 
-2.31 -2.32 
utility-of-winning 
  
0.07 
  [effort for prize value 0] 
  
-0.04 
risk-averse 
  
-4.45* 
  [1 if number of safe options 1 > 8] 
  
-2.42 
aheadness-averse 
  
-3.24 
  [1 if (2,2) is preferred to (2,1) and (3.1)] 
  
-3.10 
behindness-averse 
  
-0.40 
  [1 if (2,2) is preferred to (2,4) and (3,5)] 
  
-3.32 
constant 56.79*** 62.38*** 64.02*** 
  -1.24 -1.63 -2.37 
Dependent variable, effort in PROB    
noise-variance  -5.16** -3.83* 
  [treatment dummy]  -2.13 -2.08 
utility-of-winning   0.12*** 
  [effort for prize value 0]   -0.04 
risk-averse   -5.58*** 
  [1 if number of safe options 1 > 8]   -2.16 
aheadness-averse   0.94 
  [1 if (2,2) is preferred to (2,1) and (3.1)]   -2.77 
behindness-averse   -1.07 
  [1 if (2,2) is preferred to (2,4) and (3,5)]   -2.97 
constant 48.72*** 51.30*** 51.97*** 
  -1.09 -1.51 -2.12 
Observations 144 144 144 
Correlation 0.54 0.52 0.49 
p-value <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in parenthesis. 
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Table B5: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (DET and PP) 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable, effort in DET    
noise-variance 
 
-11.18*** -10.17*** 
  [treatment dummy] 
 
-2.31 -2.32 
utility-of-winning 
  
0.07 
  [effort for prize value 0] 
  
-0.04 
risk-averse 
  
-4.45* 
  [1 if number of safe options 1 > 8] 
  
-2.42 
aheadness-averse 
  
-3.24 
  [1 if (2,2) is preferred to (2,1) and (3.1)] 
  
-3.10 
behindness-averse 
  
-0.40 
  [1 if (2,2) is preferred to (2,4) and (3,5)] 
  
-3.32 
constant 56.79*** 62.38*** 64.02*** 
  -1.24 -1.63 -2.37 
Dependent variable, effort in PP    
noise-variance  -2.85 -1.94 
  [treatment dummy]  -1.75 -1.75 
utility-of-winning   0.08** 
  [effort for prize value 0]   -0.03 
risk-averse   -3.46* 
  [1 if number of safe options 1 > 8]   -1.82 
aheadness-averse   1.92 
  [1 if (2,2) is preferred to (2,1) and (3.1)]   -2.33 
behindness-averse   -1.81 
  [1 if (2,2) is preferred to (2,4) and (3,5)]   -2.50 
constant 43.78*** 45.21*** 45.50*** 
  -0.88 -1.24 -1.78 
Observations 144 144 144 
Correlation 0.46 0.44 0.42 
p-value <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in parenthesis. 
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Table B6: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (PP and PROB) 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable, effort in PP    
noise-variance 
 
-2.85 -1.94 
  [treatment dummy] 
 
-1.75 -1.75 
utility-of-winning 
  
0.08** 
  [effort for prize value 0] 
  
-0.03 
risk-averse 
  
-3.46* 
  [1 if number of safe options 1 > 8] 
  
-1.82 
aheadness-averse 
  
1.92 
  [1 if (2,2) is preferred to (2,1) and (3.1)] 
  
-2.33 
behindness-averse 
  
-1.81 
  [1 if (2,2) is preferred to (2,4) and (3,5)] 
  
-2.50 
constant 43.78*** 45.21*** 45.50*** 
  -0.88 -1.24 -1.78 
Dependent variable, effort in PROB    
noise-variance  -5.16** -3.83* 
  [treatment dummy]  -2.13 -2.08 
utility-of-winning   0.12*** 
  [effort for prize value 0]   -0.04 
risk-averse   -5.58*** 
  [1 if number of safe options 1 > 8]   -2.16 
aheadness-averse   0.94 
  [1 if (2,2) is preferred to (2,1) and (3.1)]   -2.77 
behindness-averse   -1.07 
  [1 if (2,2) is preferred to (2,4) and (3,5)]   -2.97 
constant 48.72*** 51.30*** 51.97*** 
  -1.09 -1.51 -2.12 
Observations 144 144 144 
Correlation 0.52 0.50 0.46 
p-value <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
 
